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1 
Executive summary 
 
In the light of the recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI), the challenges posed by its use in an ever-
increasing number of areas have serious implications for EU citizens and organisations. The consequences will 
gradually become a highly debated topic in our society: AI is starting to play a crucial part in systems for 
decision-making and autonomous processes, with potential consequences for our lives. A major concern 
comes from the various and serious vulnerabilities that affect AI techniques. These vulnerabilities could 
strongly impact the robustness of current systems, leading them into uncontrolled behaviour, and allowing 
potential adversaries to deceive algorithms to their own advantages. 
In addition to that, AI is also becoming a key technology in automated decision-making systems based on 
personal data, which may potentially have significant impacts on the fundamental rights of individuals. In this 
situation, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), applicable since 2018, has introduced a set of rights 
that relate to the explainability of AI and, in particular, that provide any individual subject to such a decision 
the possibility to ask for an explanation. The recognized opaqueness of the latest generation of AI systems 
raises the issue of how to ensure that EU citizens are able to assert this right in contexts where a decision 
taken by an AI-powered system has a negative impact on their life. 
The scientific community took the measure of these concerns at an early stage, and started to provide 
technical solutions to increase both the robustness and the explainability of AI systems. Despite these efforts, 
there is still a gap between the resulting scientific outcomes of research and the legitimate expectations the 
society may have on this novel technology. Even if AI systems currently stay under human supervision in 
relatively controlled environment, AI is expected to be deployed on a much larger scale in the next years, and 
this situation calls for an appropriate answer from regulatory bodies. 
To this end, the European Commission has committed itself to set up the principles of a trustworthy and 
secure use of AI in the digital society. Built on the multiple initiatives linked to the cybersecurity of digital 
systems, in particular the Cybersecurity Act, proposed in 2017, that introduced an EU-wide cybersecurity 
certification framework for digital products, services and processes, an ecosystem around AI technologies is 
rapidly emerging to favour innovation while protecting fundamental rights. The new Commission which took 
office in December 2019 is also determined to foster and regulate AI at the EU level, based on the policy 
activities that have been implemented since 2018. 
This Technical Report by the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) aims to contribute to this 
movement for the establishment of a sound regulatory framework for AI, by making the connection between 
the principles embodied in these policy activities and the ongoing technical discussions within the scientific 
community. The individual objectives of this report are: 
— to provide a policy-oriented description of the current perspectives of AI and its implications in society; 
— to provide an objective view on the current landscape of AI, focusing on the aspects of robustness and 
explainability. This include a technical discussion of the current risks associated with AI in terms of 
cybersecurity, safety, and data protection; 
— to present the scientific solutions that are currently under active development in the AI community to 
mitigate these risks; 
— to put forward a list of recommendations presenting policy-related considerations for the attention of the 
policy makers to establish a set of standardisation and certification tools for AI systems.   
From a technical perspective, AI today is dominated by machine learning techniques, which encompass 
various mathematical methods to extract and exploit relevant information from large collection of data. This 
aspect is what makes both the strength and weakness of automatic decision-making systems: a machine 
learning model is able to automatically learn complex structures from data, however the learned patterns are 
limited in its understanding of the world, by the lack of explicit rules or logical mechanisms. Machine learning 
algorithms are powerful to extract correlations between all sorts of complex data, but there is no strong 
guarantee that these correlations are meaningful and correspond to actual causal relationships. Furthermore, 
the complexity of models, in particular in the state-of-the-art deep learning techniques, often prevents their 
inspection and control by human operators. In this way, AI is certainly a vector of innovation, but also a source 
of major challenges with respect to cybersecurity, safety, and explainability. 
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Three important topics, deemed as essential for a right deployment of AI in the society in relation to these 
issues, are highlighted and discussed with regard to the current technical solutions existing in the scientific 
literature: 
1. Transparency of models: it relates to the documentation of the AI processing chain, including the 
technical principles of the model, and the description of the data used for the conception of the 
model. This also encompasses elements that provide a good understanding of the model, and related 
to the interpretability and explainability of models; 
2. Reliability of models: it concerns the capacity of the models to avoid failures or malfunction, either 
because of edge cases or because of malicious intentions. The main vulnerabilities of AI models have 
to be identified, and technical solutions have to be implemented to make sure that autonomous 
systems will not fail or be manipulated by an adversary; 
3. Protection of data in models: The security of data used in AI models needs to be preserved. In the 
case of sensitive data, for instance personal data, the risks should be managed by the application of 
proper organisational and technical controls. 
Several points emerged from this analysis. First, it is important to note that these topics are not mutually 
exclusive but on the contrary complementary. Notably, even if the explainability of models is a key point for 
their transparency, it is also a concept of paramount importance to assess the reliability of a model and its 
exposure to failures. Second, it has to be noted that the fast progress of AI and its current industrialization 
should not overshadow the lack of efficient measures to mitigate the risks associated to AI, these questions 
being still open problems in the scientific community. Lastly, these topics only address some aspects of the 
key requirements generally established for a trustworthy and secure use of AI, they are however of prime 
importance and directly connected to other ethical concerns, such as the fairness or the accountability of AI 
systems. 
The conclusion of this report is that it is essential to take into consideration the current technological 
advances of AI for the establishment of a regulatory framework that will promote a responsible use of the AI 
technology, while preserving innovation. As of now, several avenues for reflection could be considered to 
undertake the implementation of standards in AI technologies, as well as of security and reliability 
certifications of AI components embedded in real-world products and services. These avenues include:  
1. developing a methodology to evaluate the impacts of AI systems on society built on the model 
of the Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIA) introduced in the GDPR, that would provide an 
assessment of the risks in the usage of AI techniques to the users and organisations; 
2. introducing standardized methodologies to assess the robustness of AI models, in particular 
to determine their field of action with respect to the data that have been used for the training, the 
type of mathematical model, or the context of use, amongst others factors; 
3. raising awareness among AI practitioners through the publication of good practices regarding to 
known vulnerabilities of AI models and technical solutions to address them; 
4. promoting transparency in the conception of machine learning models, emphasizing the need of an 
explainability-by-design approach for AI systems with potential negative impacts on 
fundamental rights of users. 
The importance of the establishment of good practices and threat-driven procedures is of paramount 
importance to strengthen the trust in AI systems. This implies that all risks for the interest and rights of users, 
in the broad sense, should be taken into consideration, and appropriate safeguards measures have to be 
implemented, based on current scientific knowledge. 
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Abstract 
 
In the light of the recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI), the serious negative consequences of its use 
for EU citizens and organisations have led to multiple initiatives from the European Commission to set up the 
principles of a trustworthy and secure AI. Among the identified requirements, the concepts of robustness and 
explainability of AI systems have emerged as key elements for a future regulation of this technology.  
This Technical Report by the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) aims to contribute to this 
movement for the establishment of a sound regulatory framework for AI, by making the connection between 
the principles embodied in current regulations regarding to the cybersecurity of digital systems and the 
protection of data, the policy activities concerning AI, and the technical discussions within the scientific 
community of AI, in particular in the field of machine learning, that is largely at the origin of the recent 
advancements of this technology. 
The individual objectives of this report are to provide a policy-oriented description of the current perspectives 
of AI and its implications in society, an objective view on the current landscape of AI, focusing of the aspects 
of robustness and explainability. This also include a technical discussion of the current risks associated with AI 
in terms of security, safety, and data protection, and a presentation of the scientific solutions that are 
currently under active development in the AI community to mitigate these risks.  
This report puts forward several policy-related considerations for the attention of policy makers to establish a 
set of standardisation and certification tools for AI. First, the development of methodologies to evaluate the 
impacts of AI on society, built on the model of the Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIA) introduced in 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), is discussed. Secondly, a focus is made on the establishment 
of methodologies to assess the robustness of systems that would be adapted to the context of use. This 
would come along with the identification of known vulnerabilities of AI systems, and the technical solutions 
that have been proposed in the scientific community to address them. Finally, the aspects of transparency 
and explainability of AI are discussed, including the explainability-by-design approaches for AI models. 
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1 Introduction 
It is unanimously accepted that our times are witnessing a new technological revolution, as large parts of 
society and industry are subject to an ongoing process of digitization. The increased connectivity between 
people and devices, the access to enormous amounts of data and the ever-growing processing power have 
enabled the emergence of technologies that will change our relationship to the world and boost innovations 
by being the driver of formidable discoveries. 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a prime technology that emerged from these major changes, and has achieved 
recently tremendous progress in many areas, enabling the automation of various cognitive tasks that were 
previously out of reach of computers. It is expected that AI will profoundly reshape the social and economic 
landscape of our societies [1], and it will definitively spark innovations and foster creative solutions in fields 
such as medicine, transportation, finance, or machine translation, to name but a few. While AI will likely bring 
significant advances in these domains, it becomes also crucial to get a sense of the side effects that these 
automatic reasoning systems will inevitably cause after their integration in production products and services. 
The risks on the fundamental rights of citizens and organisations are serious, and AI will have significant 
impacts in the society. These impacts raise legitimate concerns on topics such as data protection, 
cybersecurity, privacy, reliability, fairness, or trustworthiness. Users must be guaranteed that their 
fundamental rights are protected and that products and services are safe to use. Furthermore, the rise of 
autonomy that is allowed by AI techniques requires a proper assessment of their capacity to work reliably in 
uncontrolled environments.  
Even if this technology is still in its infancy, AI systems have already caused disastrous accidents, from the 
dramatic accident of an autonomous car in 2018 with one fatality in Arizona [2] to the more anecdotal but 
still problematic case of Microsoft’s chat Bot Tay [3]. In the first example, the computer-based model used for 
the recognition of persons and objects misclassified a pedestrian as an object, leading to wrong decision-
making processes. The second example vividly showcased how easily a complex AI system can be attacked by 
ill-intentional actors to deceive an automatic text-based bot into having ethically completely unacceptable 
discussions, displaying racist and misogynistic behaviour. These are not isolated examples, and the number of 
failures and the seriousness of harm is likely to grow as AI will be more and more common. 
AI today is dominated by machine learning techniques, whose main feature is to build a reasoning system 
directly from data, often in large quantities, without explicit rules to generate the result of the process. The 
genericity of these techniques makes them very attractive in a wide range of applications. Furthermore, the 
machine learning community has adopted from its beginning an open approach for collaboration and 
dissemination, with a large collection of resources, from software, to datasets, to documentation, freely 
available to everyone. This approach boosted the popularity of machine learning in the scientific and 
engineering communities, and its adoption by practitioners of many sectors, taking advantage of the huge 
amount of data collected in digital systems.  
At the same time, the recent application of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [4] has created a 
new framework for companies that want to use personal data in automated decision-making systems. This 
framework introduced new rights for data subjects, bring new challenges in the case of AI-powered systems. 
One of them concerns the question of the interpretation of obtained outcomes, especially when these 
outcomes may have potential negative consequences for the data subjects. AI methods are famously known 
to have limited capacity to provide the reasoning principles behind a decision, mainly due to the fact that the 
logic is automatically inferred from vast amounts of data, and embedded in complex mathematical structures 
that are successful but very opaque for humans. The explainability of methods is then becoming crucial in this 
context to ensure the rights of individuals to understand a decision concerning them. 
AI systems fall under the scope of the Cybersecurity Act, proposed by the European Commission in 2017, and 
that introduced an EU-wide cybersecurity certification framework for digital products, services and processes. 
In the same way cybersecurity techniques have evolved over time to adapt to new devices and new practices, 
the need to secure and improve reliability of AI systems has become prevalent, as their opaqueness exposes 
them to strong defects, both intentional and non-intentional. Inside the AI community, connected discussions 
around AI safety [5], or biases and accountability in AI [6, 7] have emerged, and led to significant advances on 
this question. Thus, explainability and robustness are largely intertwined: understanding the mechanisms of a 
system is a standard approach to guarantee its reliability. 
In light of the serious threats that AI poses to all parts of the European society, from the violation and 
endangerment of the rights of citizens, to the jeopardizing of activities of European business, to the potential 
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uses by malicious actors, regulating frameworks need to consider the uptake of AI technologies and their 
complications to mitigate its risks and ensure a trustworthy environment for its development. 
This report aims to identify some of these limitations, and to provide with potential solutions for policy 
makers. Its central angle is to make the connection between the legitimate expectations in terms of 
robustness and explainability and the current scientific landscape of AI on these topics. The individual 
objectives of this report are:  
— to provide a policy-oriented description of the current perspectives of AI and its implications in society 
(Section 2); 
— to provide an objective view on the current landscape of the current landscape of Artificial Intelligence 
(AI), focusing of the aspects of robustness and explainability. This includes a technical discussion of the 
current risks associated with AI in terms of cybersecurity, safety, and data protection, and the scientific 
solutions that are currently under active development in the AI community to mitigate these risks (Section 
3); 
— to put forward a list of recommendations presenting policy-related considerations at the attention of the 
policy makers to establish a set of standardisation and certification tools for AI, built on state-of-the-art 
techniques, with an emphasis on their scope and limitations (Section 4). 
More broadly, the scope of this report is to explore the technical and scientific backgrounds related to the 
requirement of robustness and explainability of AI, and on that basis to chart out on which aspects concrete 
policy actions and regulations are the most needed, and to which extent it is possible to implement them with 
the current technology. 
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2 Background: Perspectives from Society and Policy making 
As with every novel technology left unregulated, AI can and will simply be employed according to its user’s 
preferences, regardless of the lawfulness of their intentions or ethical considerations. Until recently, its use 
did not raise a lot of concerns as it was limited to scientific works or commercial activities with only a limited 
scope. Now that AI has become widely deployed, it is a prime task for society and policy making to come to an 
agreement on necessary boundaries, regulations and standards for AI.  In the last three years, many reports 
have been released to provide general AI policy strategies and high-level guidelines for the use of AI in 
mainstream activities, either by national institutions [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17], international 
organisations [18, 19], or policy-oriented think tanks [20, 21].  
The most important narrative throughout these documents is that AI is both opportunity and challenge. Many 
policy recommendations are, thus, broadly set along two lines: fostering AI technology as an enabler for 
innovation, increased resilience and better competitiveness, while being increasingly aware of the lack of 
robustness of such systems and the exploitation of vulnerabilities or outright malicious use by threat actors 
and adversaries. For policy regulations, challenges and opportunities need to be weighed against each other. 
This implies that trust in researchers and innovators needs to be maintained, since regulation of a novel 
technology should not end in impeding the possibility to explore the capabilities and limitations of a 
technology. Conversely, it is mandatory for researchers and innovators to understand the need of policy 
makers to set boundaries and standards to prevent possible violations that would be contrary to European 
values.  
2.1 Policy initiatives 
The political guidelines for the new European Commission, which took office in December 2019 [22] give high 
prominence to the need for fostering and regulating AI at EU wide level: The human and ethical implications 
of AI are especially stated as one of the few highlight policy initiatives that the new Commission wants to 
tackle within the first 100 days, through cross-cutting measures. 
 
Figure 1: AI for Europe: Roadmap  
(source: EU AI factsheet1) 
The undertaking of the von der Leyen Commission rests on the initiatives launched by the previous European 
Commission. The roadmap AI for Europe (see Figure 1) details the various focused policy activities concerning 
AI that have taken place since 2018:  
— the initial European Commission AI strategy 2018 [23], focusing on the Digital Single Market, common 
investments and setting up an ethical and legal framework for AI in Europe; 
— the Coordinated Action Plan 2018 in continuation of the initial AI strategy [24]: all EU Member States 
aim to set up their own AI strategies within this EU framework by 2019. In support of this initiative, a 
                                           
1  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/factsheet-artificial-intelligence-europe 
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Science for Policy by JRC on Artificial Intelligence [1] was released last year. The present report grew out 
of the chapter on the cybersecurity perspective of AI of said report, which described in the robustness of 
AI algorithms against malicious action; 
— the appointment of an independent high level expert group (HLEG) on AI by the European 
Commission to provide input and counsel from academia and industry [25, 26]; 
— various EU wide projects under cooperation with, or guidance of, the European Commission: the AI4EU 
project2 and the AI Watch observatory3, and the European AI alliance4.  
These initiatives should be seen in the more global legal context around the cybersecurity of digital systems 
and the initiatives concerning the management of data, that both have been at the centre of various 
regulations these last years in the EU. 
2.2 Data governance and decision-making 
Data are a key aspect in AI techniques, and the widespread use of data management systems that has been 
enabled by the digitalization of services have led to the emergence of principles to properly store and handle 
these data. The concept of Data Governance has appeared to describe the set of practices, procedures norms 
and rules to ensure that data collected by organizations are well-managed (lawfulness, accountability, etc.). 
The European Commission has been particularly active to set up a legal framework that implements these 
principles, in order to provide an environment that both boost innovation while protecting fundamental rights: 
The Regulation on a framework for the free flow of non-personal data [27] aims at removing obstacles to the 
free movement of non-personal data, while the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [4] provides a 
framework adapted for the handling of personal data by any organization. 
The GDPR became applicable in Europe in 2018 putting forward a modernised set of rules fit for the digital 
age. It is of particular interest for AI, as it introduces specific elements to tackle the growing adoption of AI in 
decision-making systems based on personal data. 
Several of the provisions of the GDPR relate to this topic. The recital 71 of the regulation already foresees 
cases in which algorithms are used for profiling or to automate decision-making, and it introduces and 
motivates the need to introduce safeguards for such processes. These safeguards aim to protect against 
potential adverse consequences that profiling or automatic decision-making can have on data subjects.  
The application of AI to personal data, or more generically automatic processing, is considered in the GDPR 
under different circumstances. The first one is in profiling, which is defined in Article 4 as Any form of 
automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal 
aspects relating to a natural person. The second one is solely automated decision-making, which is defined 
in [28] as the ability to make decisions by technological means without human involvement. This refers to the 
broader notion of the application of algorithms for the purposes of decision-making, which may or may not 
involve some form of profiling in doing so. Several examples on this topic can be found in [28].  
Recital 71 contextualises the set of data subject rights relevant to both profiling and automated decision-
making that are developed in the several articles of the regulation, including the right to information, to 
obtain human intervention, to express his/her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the outcome of a 
decision and to challenge such decision.  
Article 13 and 14 of the GDPR require that data subjects are informed about the existence of automated 
decision making, including but not limited to profiling. Further, the articles require that data controllers provide 
data subjects with information about the underlying mechanisms (logics) behind the automated decision-
making performed and the significance and potential consequences of such processing. The right of access 
(article 15) also include similar provisions, granting data subjects the right to access their personal data and 
obtain such information about its processing from the data controllers. 
These articles refer respectively to Article 22 where additional specific provisions on automated individual 
decision-making are introduced. Data subjects have the right not to be subject to a decision exclusively based 
on automated processing if such decision affects him/her legally or significantly in any other way, unless any 
of the exceptions foreseen in Paragraph 2 applies (necessary for a contract, authorised by Union or Member 
State Law or based on data subject explicit consent). 
                                           
2 https://www.ai4eu.eu/ 
3 https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/ai-watch/about_en 
4 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/european-ai-alliance 
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Article 22 emphasises the requirement to implement appropriate measures to safeguard the rights and 
freedoms of data subjects. In those cases, where automated decision-making takes place, it does so by 
granting data subjects the right to obtain human intervention, to express their point of view and to be able to 
contest the decision taken. The guidelines released on this topic by the Article 29 Working Party [28] state that 
human intervention implies that the human-in-the-loop should refer to someone with the appropriate 
authority and capability to change the decision.  
It is clear how the requirement of explainability is relevant for the envisaged safeguards. Human supervision 
can only be effective if the person reviewing the process can be in a position to assess the algorithmic 
processing carried out. This implies that such processing should be understandable. Further, explainability is 
also key to ensure that data subjects are able to express their point of view and are capable of contesting the 
decision. As it is stated in the Article 29 guidelines, data subjects will only be able to do that if they fully 
understand how the automated decision was made an on which bases. 
The Article 29 guidelines provide in Annex 1 a set of good practice recommendations for data controllers, with 
respect to the several rights and provisions of the GDPR that are of relevance for profiling and automated 
decision making. On top of the generic transparency requirements, as commented in [29], data controllers 
have the specific requirement to provide understandable explanations to data subjects in automated decision-
making. Since the entered into force of the GDPR the academic community has debated about this right to 
explanation [30]. The intention of the present report is not to enter into this legal discussion, but rather to 
focus on the immediate challenges that the usage of machine learning techniques presents in this regard. It is 
easy to see how the current technical limitations of AI models can cause difficulties in the practical 
implementation of provisions described in the GDPR and the related data subject rights. 
One of these limitations relate to the interpretability of AI models, which connects to the right of data 
subjects to receive meaning information about the logics involved in automatic decision-making processes 
and the right that data subjects have to be able to contest a decision, both of which require the provision of 
understandable explanations to them.  
Table 1: Data protection rights introduced in the GDPR linked to algorithmic processing of data (see [28, 31] for more 
details) 
 Right GDPR References 
Right to be notified of solely automated decision making Art. 13, Art. 14 
Right of notification and access to information about logics involved in 
automated processing 
Art. 13, Art. 14, Art. 15 
Right on information of significance of and potential effects of solely 
automated decision making 
Art. 13, Art. 14. Art. 15 
Right not to be subject to solely automated decision making Art. 22 
Right to contest a decision in solely automated decision making Art. 22 
Right to obtain human intervention Recital 71, Art. 22 
Right to obtain an explanation Recital 71 
Table 1 summarises the several rights of the GDPR that refer to any of the forms of automatic processing 
accounted for in the regulation. In addition to these rights, all the other ones generically referring to the 
processing of personal data also apply, namely the right of information (in a broader sense), the right of 
access, the right of rectification and the right to object [28], as well as the specific legal basis (art.6) used by 
the data controller (usually data subject consent). 
9 
2.3 From Data Governance to AI Governance 
A similar movement to data governance, now for the management of Artificial Intelligence is currently gaining 
momentum [32, 33] to make sure that the design and the implementation of AI systems are aligned with 
values and responsibilities of organisations and society.  
To this end, on the one hand, the new Commission policy initiatives focus on fostering investment research 
and development, attracting and building up skills and expertise, strengthening European cooperation and 
increasing access to data for AI development.  
On the other hand, various organisations have stressed the need of ethical principles and increased 
trustworthiness of AI [34, 35, 36, 37]. From the European perspective, the HLEG already published their Ethical 
guidelines for trustworthy AI [25, 26, 35, 36] under the previous Commission. The guidelines clearly define the 
boundaries of current AI system’s capabilities and chart out what is needed to make them trustworthy from a 
complete societal point of view, including ethical and legal considerations. As the current main pillar from 
which to derive guidance on AI development from the policy perspective, the guidelines list seven broad key 
requirements [26]:  
1. human agency and oversight: protection of fundamental rights, interaction between humans and 
AI systems;  
2. technical robustness and safety: resilience, accuracy, reliability of AI systems;  
3. privacy and data governance: data protection, data management, privacy rights;  
4. transparency: traceability, explainability, communication;  
5. diversity, non-discrimination and fairness: accessibility, lawfulness;  
6. environmental and societal well-being: sustainability, social and societal impact;  
7. accountability: auditability, reporting, responsibility.  
It is noteworthy that the requirements (1), (2), (3) and (4) are emphasizing elements that directly link to the 
fields of AI robustness, explainability, legal considerations of data protection and cybersecurity.  
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3 Artificial Intelligence and its Robustness and Explainability: Overview 
and limitations 
 
3.1 Artificial intelligence and Machine Learning: A short overview 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is generally defined as methods capable of rational and autonomous reasoning, 
action or decision making, and/or adaptation to complex environment, and to previously unseen 
circumstances [38, 25]. It is deeply rooted in the field of computer science, and regroups different sets of 
techniques that led to significant advances in the automation of human level tasks in the second half of the 
twentieth century, nonetheless without much impact beyond academic circles. Much of the real and tangible 
successes of AI today can be directly linked to the hugely successful subfield of machine learning, and in 
particular the rising technique of deep learning that reached tremendous milestones these last years in 
computer vision, natural language processing or game reasoning. In this report, only the machine learning 
aspect of AI will be considered, as it encompasses the vast majority of the AI landscape. 
3.1.1 Machine learning 
Machine learning [39, 40] consists in a set of mathematical techniques at the intersection of algorithmic, 
statistical learning and optimisation theory, that aim to extracting information from a set of examples 
(images, sensor records, text, etc.) in order to solve a problem related to this data (classification, recognition, 
generation, etc.). Machine learning can be roughly divided into three paradigms: In the supervised setting, each 
example includes a label, that can be either categorical or scalar: For a given input, the model aims to predict 
the right label. In the unsupervised (or self-supervised) setting, no label is provided, the model aiming at 
learning a new representation that groups the examples based on their similarity. The last category regroups 
reinforcement learning techniques, in which an agent is trained to perform a complex sequence of actions 
autonomously in a complex environment, in order to maximize a reward function. In today’s machine learning 
applications, supervised techniques are predominant, and have been mainly applied to decision-making 
systems. 
Although distinct, the tools and technologies overlap over the three categories, and most approaches, such as 
decision trees, linear regression, or SVMs, have been used over the decades in any of the three paradigms. In 
these traditional machine learning approaches, descriptors of the data, called features, are constructed and 
used to train a mathematical model, that will discover and extract statistical patterns that are significant for 
the problem one aims to solve. Nowadays, deep learning [41] (or the use of multi-layered neural networks) 
has gained special interest from the scientific and engineering communities, in particular for its capacity to 
include the crafting of features as part of the learning process, dramatically increasing the performances. 
They are, in particular, very well adapted to learn new representations of data that are more compact and 
more informative. Deep learning excels in tasks related to perception (image characterization, sound 
recognition, etc.) where traditional machine learning techniques struggle to handle the high dimensionality of 
data. It has also led to generative tools, such as GANs [42], that have been a major improvement in the field 
of computer-assisted synthesis, with a capacity to generate original data with a striking realism. 
AI systems are inherently more complex than classical decision-making systems: they are composed of a 
possibly non-linear feedback loop system between an algorithm and a dataset which, together, constitute a 
learning model that acts as the actual reasoning systems, outputting predictions based on inputs. This model 
is then embedded into a more traditional program, often combined with other pieces of code or software 
architecture, possibly implemented using different programming tools than those used to write the AI models. 
If these systems are introduced in a careless manner, the integrity of the whole architecture is possibly 
threatened since the security controls in place may not be adequate anymore. 
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Examples of AI decision-making systems 
1. An environmental association wants to release a phone application to their members that allow them 
to automatically identify using supervised learning the type of butterfly they may encounter just by using 
their camera. To do that, the data science team in charge of the project first asks its members to take 
pictures of butterflies, and manually determines the species based on a nomenclature. Once the number of 
images is sufficient, a computer vision model is trained to automatically determine the species of butterflies.  
2. A commercial bank uses machine learning for marketing purposes. Based on the payments made by 
the customers, several predefined attributes are extracted (number of operations per day, total amount spent 
per day, etc.). From these features, unsupervised techniques are implemented to separate customers in 
different categories based on their behavioural activities. These categories are then used to design 
customised marketing strategies.  
3. An advertisement company wants to increase the number of clicks in the ads displayed to visitors of 
a website. To do that, a reinforcement learning model is used to generate an eye-catching advertisement, 
featuring the image of the product and a generated slogan. The model can adapt the way the elements are 
arranged, as well as the text, and the format. The system gets a reward every time a visitor clicks on the ad.  
4. A physics research group wants to simulate the signals that will be returned by a sensor. To do that, 
the group has at its disposal millions of experimental signals that have been acquired in many different 
conditions, with a wide range of sensors. The team builds then a generative model that will simulate, based 
on statistical correlations, the signals that one may obtain in unknown experimental conditions.  
3.1.2 Artificial General Intelligence 
As for many technological advances, discussions of AI bear the danger of overestimating its capabilities and 
robustness [43], or getting lost in marketing and buzz wording [44, 45]. AI is often used for any type of 
automated decision system [7] and unfortunately tends to be improperly used as a marketing argument.  
On a different note, ideas such as conscious AI, AI replacing humans for almost any kind of work, or generally, 
AI being credited as an all-purpose solution to every problem, are far from being achieved and even relevant 
for the actual discussion of current AI systems. 
Nevertheless, even if researchers in the AI community agree on the unlikeliness of the emergence of a 
human-level intelligence in the coming decades, the ever-growing place of AI in our life raises relevant 
concerns that experts try to address. Linked to the inner mechanisms of AI (robustness, explainability, 
transparency, data protection amongst others) AI may turn out to be harmful in a situation where autonomy 
is given to a system without appropriate safeguards to monitor its activity, independent of the specifications 
of the model. The development of mechanisms to create safe AI systems by design in this setting is still an 
active area of research [46]. Appropriate answers to ensure the transparency and reliability of AI systems, as 
discussed below, would be one of the solutions to address this issue and keep AI beneficial for humanity. 
3.2 Transparency of AI systems 
Transparency usually refers to the possibility to have a complete view on a system, i.e., all aspects are visible 
and can be scrutinized for analysis. In the case of AI systems, three levels of transparency can be 
distinguished:  
1. Implementation: at this level, the way the model acts on the input data to output a prediction is 
known, including the technical principles of the model (e.g., sequence of operations, set of conditions, 
etc.) and the associated parameters (e.g., coefficients, weights, thresholds, etc.). This is the standard 
level of transparency of most open source models available on the Internet and provided by 
researchers. Such systems are often referred as white-box model, in contrast to black-box model 
where the model is unknown; 
2. Specifications: this refers to all information that led to the obtained implementation, including 
details about the specifications of the model (e.g., task, objectives, context, etc.) training dataset, the 
training procedure (e.g., hyper-parameters, cost function, etc.), the performances, as well as any 
element that allows to reproduce from scratch the implementation. Research papers usually fulfil in 
part this level of transparency; 
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3. Interpretability: this corresponds to the understanding of the underlying mechanisms of the model 
(e.g., the logical principles behind the processing of data, the reason behind an output, etc.). This also 
includes the demonstration that the algorithm follows the specifications and is aligned with human 
values (e.g., in terms of fairness). This aspect is discussed more broadly in the next section. In a 
general manner, this level of transparency is not achieved in current AI systems. 
Most real-world AI systems used in production are not transparent, either because the implementation and 
the specifications are not publicly available (for matter of intellectual property for instance), and/or because 
the model is too complicated and no simple interpretation of results can be made. In the following, two 
approaches to increase the transparency of models are discussed. 
3.2.1 Documentation of specifications 
Faced with a large number of models aimed for various different tasks and developed in many different 
contexts, there is a need to provide a consistent documentation alongside code implementation to identify use 
cases and follow a traceability process essential for industry applications, particularly in sensitive areas. One 
reason for that comes from the development of AI, which has been and is still driven by the research 
community, who does not have the same practices as industrial actors and has a tendency to release model 
implementations without proper specifications nor maintenance procedures, other than an elusive research 
paper. To remedy this situation, some works have been proposed to provide templates to document a 
machine learning model. 
In [47] a template is introduced to properly document the training dataset. This documentation is structured 
into seven categories: Motivation of the dataset, its composition, the collection process, the preprocessing 
applied to the data, including cleaning and labelling, its expected uses, the ways of distribution, and finally the 
procedure implemented for its maintenance. A similar approach is considered in [48] but more focused on the 
model, describing the data used for the training and the evaluation phase, technical details about the model; 
the way it has been trained, as well as various measures of performances. 
3.2.2 Interpretability and understandability 
Although the advent of widespread use of machine learning and especially deep neural network techniques 
has clearly induced current discussions about the need for more interpretable AI models, this topic is not 
novel: Early AI research on expert systems in the 1980s already raised questions about AI explainability 
(see [49, 50] for a more detailed review). Nonetheless, discussions about explainable AI have significantly 
broadened: from a growing literature of technical work on interpretable models and explainable AI [51, 52], to 
an ongoing discussion about the precise meaning and definition of explainability and interpretability  [53, 50, 
54], to more procedural questions about the evaluation of existing frameworks [55], or even to input from 
social science about the meaning of explanation [56].  
As noted in [56], most methods and tools introduced by researchers in the AI community to explain AI systems 
do not rely on a formal definition of what an explanation is, albeit this question has been the subject of works 
in fields such as cognitive science or social psychology [57, 58] for decades or even centuries. On the contrary, 
explanatory approaches in AI rely on the idea of providing elements to explain the results to a human in 
understandable terms, without agreeing on a common formal definition that varies depending on author and 
context [53, 50, 54]. 
3.2.3 Aspects of interpretability 
In most cases, interpretability is often (but not always) loosely defined as a variant of how well a human 
could understand the decisions of an autonomous algorithmic system [56, 55, 49]. The interpretability of 
predictive models can be characterized following different aspects. Generally, there are two main objectives 
pursued behind interpretability approaches. In the global interpretability setup, the elements that need to be 
explained cover all the steps of the machine learning processing chain. They include:  
— the logic of the model: what kind of features are used, and how they are considered to return the outputs. 
This can be based on conditions derived from the comparison of the value of features, or on linear and 
non-linear operations of those features.  
— a description of the kind of data that are expected to be used in the model, including the boundaries of 
the input space (e.g., only valid for male individuals aged from 50 to 80, or for images taken by 
commercial cameras in daylight). Datasets often contain biases that can have a strong influence on the 
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mechanisms learned by the model. Careful description of the dataset (see [47, 48] for examples of a 
template for such description) is then essential to understand what is learned by a model. 
— in the case of classification tasks, how the decision is taken using the output values (e.g., in the case of 
thresholding, how the threshold is chosen).  
The second approach focuses on providing an explanation for a single prediction made by the system using 
specific input data. While this explanation can be given at the light of the understanding of the global model, 
specific approaches can be designed to explain the decision. This can be done for instance by highlighting the 
most prominent features that come into play in the decisions, or by generating counterfactual 
explanations [59], that return which features should be changed to modify the decision (e.g., in the case of 
credit scoring, what are the requirements that are not achieved by the customer whose application has been 
denied). 
Example of a counterfactual explanation 
An AI scoring system is implemented in a university to automatically allocate scholarship based on school 
results of the previous year. The process also takes into account the average academic standard of the class 
of the applicant. A student A has been denied the application. To justify the decision, the system returns the 
following counterfactual explanations: You would have obtained the scholarship if one of the following 
conditions were reached:  
• the average score over all topics was higher than 14 (currently: 12.6);  
• the score in mathematics was higher than 11 (currently: 12) AND the average score of the class in 
physics was lower than 11 (currently: 13);  
• the mark in physics was higher than the average mark in physics (currently: 11 < 12.6).  
3.2.4 Interpretable models vs. post-hoc interpretability 
Two approaches in interpretable AI are generally considered, depending on the nature of the model:  
— Post-hoc interpretability is used to extract explanations from black box model that are not inherently 
interpretable, such as high dimensional models (e.g., deep learning models) that include a tremendous 
number of parameters. The interpretation is done through reverse engineering, by selectively querying the 
model to reveal some of its properties. Many approaches from the literature of post-hoc interpretability 
aim to train an openly interpretable surrogate model on the basis of these queries [51]. 
— Interpretable models: these models are fully or partially designed to provide reliable and easy to 
understand explanations of the prediction they output from the start [52]. The problem is that it stands to 
reason as to whether it is always possible to design an appropriate interpretable model to the desired 
accuracy. The feasibility of this approach is highly debated, especially in application cases where the most 
accurate solutions are usually provided by complex models such as deep neural networks. 
It is worth noting that most methods for interpretability are themselves based on statistical tools that are 
subject to uncertainty or errors. Their outputs do not then constitute a true statement but should also be 
carefully analysed and understood. 
 
Example of post-hoc interpretability method in computer vision 
Several techniques to explain the decision made by a classifier for computer vision tasks. Generally, it consists 
in defining the area of interest, that has been found relevant by the classifier for the decision. In this example, 
the decision of a computer vision model trained on the ImageNet dataset [60], a widely-used dataset used for 
computer vision, is explained using a method introduced in [119]. In Figure 2, the explanation of the decision 
to correctly classify the image as squirrel is displayed, highlighting the area comprising the head of the 
animal. 
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Figure 2: Explanation provided by the method introduced in [119], indicating which area of the image has been found to 
be relevant for the decision of the classifier. 
3.2.5 Interpretability vs. accuracy 
The aforementioned problems with designing interpretable models are part of a larger discussion, in which it 
is debated whether a trade-off exists in machine learning model design between interpretability and accuracy. 
Usually, more complex models are employed in pursuit of higher accuracies or to achieve more complex tasks. 
Making those models more interpretable in turn seems to almost inevitably come with a loss in these 
features. On the other hand, the assumption that under given constraints better results can only be achieved 
with a more complex model, can be challenged, especially when good feature engineering is combined with 
simpler but robust models [52]. Yet from another angle, the very notion of what a complex and less 
interpretable model means might depend on the point of view, constraints or situation [53]. 
The question of how much the outputs of a given algorithm are still understandable for a human or even 
fundamentally uniquely explainable (e.g., because of non-linear functions employed in many machine learning 
models) is crucial for a reliable assessment of its security. 
3.3 Reliability of AI systems 
Despite their performances, AI systems are not yet considered as reliable enough to be fully autonomous in 
complex environments without human supervision. Beyond the classical software vulnerabilities that are 
inherent to any piece of software, and that will not be discussed here, their characteristic opens up new 
surface of vulnerabilities that are still largely little known. The case of the first fatal accident involving an 
autonomous car and a pedestrian that happened in 2018 in Arizona is an example of the global lack of 
reliability of AI systems. In the Vehicle Automation Report of the accident [2] written by the National 
Transportation Safety Board is reported the predictions made by the system a few seconds before the impact. 
In a nutshell, the pedestrian was alternatively detected as a vehicle (and then considered as traveling in the 
other lane), and as an unknown (static) object. 2.5 seconds before impact, it was seen as a bicycle, and 1.2 
seconds before as being on the path of the car. An alarm was raised, and 0.02s before impact the operator 
took control of the wheel. One observation made is that the system design did not include a consideration for 
jaywalking pedestrians. 
A distinction is made here between two signs indicating that a learned machine learning model is not reliable:  
1. Poor performances: the model cannot perform well in the task in conditions that are considered as 
normal for humans;  
2. Vulnerabilities: the model performs well but has vulnerabilities that may lead to malfunctions in 
specific conditions. These malfunctions may appear either naturally in the course of the execution of 
the program, or be intentionally provoked by an adversary with malicious intentions.  
Assessing the reliability of a system requires then to consider these two aspects. 
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3.3.1 Evaluation of performances 
The evaluation of performances is an important aspect that is central during the conception of a machine 
learning model. It is a multi-faceted question that include amongst others the choice of the right metrics and 
of the procedure of evaluation. 
The choice of the right metric is crucial to assess its capacity to solve the problem. It is generally driven by the 
kind of data, the choice of the class of models, and above the specifications of the task. No matter how good 
is the chosen metric, it will still be an approximation, and therefore it will not encompass all the aspects of 
the studied task. The danger then lies in optimizing the model in order to maximize the performance metric, 
that may lead to a model with good performances but not adapted to the actual problem.5. 
Example of the evaluation of performances on a binary decision making system 
A binary decision-making system is considered, to determine, based on medical images, if a tumour is present 
or not. Even though the models output a dichotomous answer (True or False), the algorithm first computes a 
probability, that acts as a level of confidence of the model on the decision, and is then transformed into a 
decision after application of a threshold. The threshold has a significant influence on the performances, and 
its choice is guided by the problem: a low threshold will label more instances as positive, limiting the risk of 
missing a true positive, but increasing the number of false positive. Conversely, a high threshold will reduce 
the number of detected samples, while increasing the risk of missing a relevant example. Existing measures 
of performances (such as AUC) takes into account this phenomenon, but determining a right value above 
which a performance metrics is acceptable may turn out to be problematic. 
As for the evaluation procedure, beyond the common practices already well-established in the machine 
learning community (splitting the dataset into a training set and a test set, imbalance of the dataset taken 
into consideration), several points are worth to be mentioned in relation with reliability, inspired by clinical 
trials performed in health context and discussed in [60]. 
The first point is the importance of an external validation, independent from the training phase, to limit 
overfitting, which occurs when the model does not learn any meaningful pattern but only memorize the input 
data, reducing greatly the generalization power of the model. Even if external validation can be to some 
degree compared to the testing phase in machine learning procedures, in which the model is evaluated on 
previously unseen data, it goes beyond by extending the testing to other form of validation, described in [60] 
as temporal and geographical to highlight the fact that the data have been collected at a different time and 
at a different location. While this has to be adapted to the domain of application, the idea that a proper 
validation has to be performed in different situations is crucial to correctly assess the model.  
The second point emphasized in [60] is the risk of spectrum bias, that refers to the presence of examples in 
the dataset that does not reflect the diversity and the complexity of situations, i.e., the spectrum of examples 
does not reflect the real spectrum. It implies that good performances on obvious examples are not sufficient 
to assess the capacity of the model to correctly handle more ambiguous situations.  
Finally, this study identifies the risk that despite high performances, the system does not provide a real 
benefit for the users, or lead to a blind trust in a AI system that even with high performances stays prone to 
errors. 
3.3.2 Vulnerabilities of machine learning 
In an adversarial context, Artificial Intelligence models open new vectors of attacks compared to classic 
software: as displayed in Figure 3, representing the paradigm change induced by AI components in the 
cybersecurity of digital systems, vulnerabilities can be exploited at the level of the different elements present 
in the AI processing chain, multiplying the potential threats and then the global risk of failures. 
 
  
                                           
5 This is summarized in [10] as an adage known as the Goodheart’s law: When a measure becomes a target, it 
ceases to be a good measure. 
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Figure 3: Paradigm change in the cybersecurity of systems because of the introduction of AI components. 
Although many common techniques require the knowledge of the parameters of the model (white-box 
settings) to exploit these vulnerabilities and build attacks, this is unlikely to be a limiting factor for attackers: 
first, it has been shown that it is feasible to perform these attacks in a black-box setting with comparable 
performances [61], by approximating the model through a limited series of well-designed queries. Second, 
adversarial examples have been shown to possess a property of transferability in many configurations [62], 
i.e., malicious samples from a model, designed by the attacker, can be still effective against a target model. 
Finally, any breach of security of the system storing the AI model could be exploited in order to discover its 
mathematical structure, and plan a more comprehensive attack. 
Typical vulnerabilities intrinsically linked to AI systems [43, 63, 64], include the following ones. 
Data poisoning 
It consists in deliberately introducing false data at the training stage of the model [65]. This can be done to 
neutralize a system, reduce its performance, or silently introduce a backdoor exploitable by the adversary. 
Data poisoning relies on the capacity of models to learn new patterns along the time by constant retraining 
almost in real time using newly acquired data. This design opens the possibility for an attacker to inject 
gradually benign data that will progressively drift away the decision boundaries of the algorithm [63]. In a 
similar way, reinforcement learning systems can easily be misled to maximize wrong goals by corrupting the 
reward channels of their agents [66, 67, 68]. 
This attack can also be performed at the production stage, by an attacker who would have access to the 
training data, but also who would have the control of a pretrained model. The training of a model, especially 
the most complicated ones, requires indeed tremendous amount of data and huge computational and human 
resources, and it is common to reuse models that have been trained by third party. An adversary could use 
this opportunity to conceal backdoors that it could exploit subsequently. 
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Crafting of adversarial examples 
The most active research domain currently is without doubt the domain of adversarial examples. It consists in 
using input data to the trained machine learning model, which are deliberately designed to be 
misclassified [72, 64, 73]. The development of techniques to this end has been an active area of research, 
with a host of different types of attacks [74, 75, 76, 77, 61, 78], relying mostly on optimisation procedure to 
synthesize adversarial examples. Most of the attacks focused on classification task in computer vision, this 
subdomain being one of the most active area of deep learning research. Deep learning image analysis 
systems have been proved to be sensitive to input image spoofing of various kinds [72, 74, 79].  
 
 
Figure 4: Illustration of an adversarial example using Basic Iterative Method [69]. The classifier used is Inception v3 [70]. 
The image comes from the validation of the ImageNet dataset [71] (left) Original image, correctly classified as a school 
bus. (middle) Perturbation added to the image, with a 10x amplification (right) Adversarial example, wrongly classified 
with high confidence. 
Example of an adversarial example in computer vision 
In Figure 4 is displayed an illustration of an attack on a standard classifier using basic projected gradient 
descent. While the object is correctly classified after the training of the model, adding a small perturbation on 
the pixels of the image, almost imperceptible to humans, significantly degrades the performance of the 
classifier, which assigns a wrong label with a high confidence. Adversarial attacks are nonetheless not limited 
to image classification, and has also been successfully applied in different contexts, such as image 
segmentation [80], object recognition [81], speech recognition [82], text summarization [83], as well as 
unsupervised [84] or generative [77] models. 
Model flaws 
It consists in taking advantage of the inherent weaknesses of the mathematical procedures involved in the 
learning process of the model [5, 63]. The usage of a specific architecture known to be susceptible to various 
phenomena, such as the presence of noise, can enable the attacker to fool the system. 
Despite the relatively insecure settings in which those attacks occur, the impact on real-world activities is 
expected to be profound, as the implementation of these attacks is already feasible in a more constrained 
context. In [69, 85, 74] are discussed several approaches to construct adversarial examples robust to several 
transformations happening in the physical world, such as viewpoint shifts, noise, low or high brightness, and 
so forth and so on. This has practical consequences, for example on the development of autonomous cars 
that strongly rely on computer vision techniques [86, 87]. Adversarial attacks can also be directly performed 
on the car itself after exploiting a vulnerability of the car’s software, as in [88].  
3.3.3 Approaches to increase the reliability of machine learning models 
Designing AI specific security controls is an active, albeit young, field of research in adversarial machine 
learning, that naturally arises with the advent of attack against machine learning models. Depending on 
circumstances, such as the intention of the attack, the type of vulnerability, and the kind of model, two main 
approaches have been proposed to mitigate the risks of wrong behaviour of models [89, 63, 5, 90, 91, 92]: 
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These approaches follow the well-known security-by-design principle, i.e. taking the security of a software or 
application into account from the beginning of the design process. It should be noted that for machine 
learning based AI systems this approach likely implies a degradation of performance that is inherent to 
statistical approaches [93]. 
Data sanitization 
Cleaning the training data of all potentially malicious content before training the model is a way to prevent 
data poisoning [94]. Depending on the situation, another AI system can be employed to act as a filter, or 
classical input sanitization based on handcrafted rules can be used. In very important circumstances though, 
human intervention might be inevitable. 
Robust learning 
Redesigning the learning procedure to be robust against malicious action, especially adversarial examples [95, 
96]. This entails explicit training against known adversarial examples, as well as redesigning the mathematical 
foundation of the algorithms by employing techniques from statistics, such as regularization and robust 
inference.  
It is interesting to note that, as it has been the case in cybersecurity for decades, there is a constant race 
between attackers and defenders to attack and protect AI models. As an example, we can cite a robust 
learning technique called distillation [97], which acts on the outputs of the model to reduce its sensitivity to 
adversarial examples. This defence has been broken [98], then improved to resist to these attacks [99], and 
we can expect this process to keep going. The underlying mechanisms are then very similar to those presents 
in traditional cybersecurity systems, and similar strategies could be implemented. 
Extensive testing 
The testing of a model cannot be restricted to a single dataset. Rigorous benchmarking requires the take into 
account of edge cases that can arise either because a given example has not been taken into account in the 
training data, or because the input data is slightly corrupted, and not recognizable by the model.  
 
Figure 5: Illustration of the different alterations defined in [100], performed on an image of a boat from the ImageNet 
dataset [71], to mimic different weather conditions or noise that may appear on the sensors.  
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Example of augmented dataset for testing in computer vision 
In [100] several approaches have been proposed to mimic several conditions that may appear in the capture 
of images. It includes weather conditions (snow, fog, brightness, etc.), as well as different types of noise that 
may appear on the pictures taken by optical sensors, such as Gaussian noise, speckle, motion blur, etc.  In 
Figure 5, an example of such alterations is given on an image of a boat extracted from the ImageNet 
dataset [71], a widely-used dataset used for computer tasks such as classification, segmentation or 
recognition. Using techniques defined in [100], a new dataset called ImageNet-C is generated, enabling 
designers of computer vision to assess the robustness of their model against these alterations. 
Formal verification 
Formal verification is a very active field in computer science who aims to prove the correctness of a software 
or hardware systems with respect to specified properties, using mathematical proofs. Two main properties are 
often investigated:  
— (Un)satisfiability: checking if for a given input, getting a certain output is (not) feasible; 
— Robustness: checking if adding noise to a given input changes its output. 
In a supervised learning context, most issues can be formulated as a satisfiability problem, i.e., checking that 
the model cannot output a wrong label. Verifying the satisfiability property is nonetheless in the majority of 
cases not possible, as the input space is infinite, and not known. This issue is circumvented by considering 
instead an evaluation of the robustness of the model at the inputs present in the dataset, as an 
approximation to the real input space. These methods aim to guarantee that for all points in a neighbourhood 
of a given input, the outputs stay the same. 
Example of a formal verification procedure in malware analysis 
In a malware analysis context, one example of satisfiability property that is desirable is that a malicious file 
should not be classified as benign. In practice though, it is not possible to have access to all (existing and non-
existing) malicious files to verify the property, and there is no formal specification of what is a malicious file. 
Using existing samples, modifying the samples while preserving their maliciousness (that can be practically 
challenging) can ensure that at the neighbourhood of the known samples, the model correctly classifies the 
sample as malicious. 
In a nutshell, methods used for formal verification of deep neural networks rely on the same idea as for SMT 
problems, where linear constraints are combined to derive the domain space of acceptable solutions. For the 
verification of the robustness property, it consists in deriving the constraint applied to the outputs, given the 
operations successively applied on the inputs. The last step consists then in verifying that this domain is 
included in the same decision region as the outputs. 
When those operations are linear, i.e., adding or multiplying a factor to the inputs affects likewise the outputs, 
the verification is straightforward as efficient algorithms, such as the simplex algorithms, exist and are easily 
scalable. Modern machine learning algorithms, such as neural networks, are nonetheless highly non-linear, 
and does not fall within the scope of application of these algorithms. Several techniques have been 
introduced in the case of deep learning: in [101] approximations of non-linear functions are used to perform 
the verification; in [102], the regions around inputs is propagated at each layer of the network; in [103], the 
inputs are clustered to derive safe regions in which the classifier is robust. 
Despite the promising results, these techniques are not able yet to scale up to consider large networks. 
3.4 Protection of data in AI systems 
Machine learning models are built on large amount of data, extracting statistical patterns to solve a specific 
task. The dataset used for the training can nonetheless be sensitive, either because it contains personal 
information (medical records, emails, geolocation, etc.) or because the content is restricted (intellectual 
property, strategic systems, etc.). For personal data, systems should be compliant in regards to the legislation 
on privacy and data protection, and then appropriate technical and organizational measures should be put in 
place to implement data protection principles. An example is the EU General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) that applies in all EU member states. The application of anonymization or pseudonymization  [104] to 
these data is a safeguard recommended by the GDPR, although the feasibility to do so highly depends on the 
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context of the application and furthers the complexity of the employed systems even more, potentially 
impacting the explainability of the AI system. 
More generally, building an AI system based on sensitive data requires then to ensure that all actors involved 
in the machine learning pipeline, from the collection of data, to their processing, to the training of the model, 
to its maintenance, and to its use, are considered trustworthy to handle the data.  
In this section are described the main risks regarding to the confidentiality of data, as well as several 
mechanisms to mitigate them and guarantee some levels of data protection. These mechanisms are not 
exclusive, and should be combined and appended to classic approaches used for the protection of data 
management systems. 
3.4.1 Threats against data 
The quality and correctness of the training data is of paramount importance to ensure that AI systems 
employing machine learning techniques, designed to be trained with data, operate properly. Together with the 
machine learning algorithm in charge of building the model, the training data is part of the AI system and, as 
such, it forms part of the scope of security that needs to be protected. It is, therefore, crucial to ensure the 
security of data sets in terms of their confidentiality, integrity and availability, as well as their compliance 
with possible data protection frameworks. 
In practice, many challenges have to be faced given the complex supply and processing chain involved in 
complex AI systems. The high computational cost of machine learning algorithms often requires for instance 
to outsource to an external contractor the training of models. It may not be possible however to fully trust all 
the actors involved in the process for the protection of sensitive data. Two risks are considered: 
1. sensitive data are directly accessible to an untrustworthy actor, due to malicious intent or 
vulnerabilities in the data infrastructure; 
2. sensitive data may leak from the model after the training. 
The second risk makes reference to the capacity of memorization of machine learning models. Models are 
indeed trained to extract patterns from data, and usually store them as parameters of the models, for 
instance under the form of weights. The aim of the training phase is to make the model memorize 
generalizable patterns, that will be relevant for data that are not present in the training dataset. Nevertheless, 
these patterns can be very similar to the training data, and can be retrieved by adversaries: An example of 
such an attack is described in [105], where credit card numbers are extracted from a natural language 
processing model developed for autocompletion and that has been trained on vast amounts of text data. 
Memorization is often associated with overfitting. Preventing overfitting though regularization techniques 
limits the memorization effect, but only partially, as various techniques have been designed to recover 
degraded but exploitable data present in the training set [106, 107]. 
3.4.2 Differential privacy 
Differential privacy [108, 109] consists in adding noise to the training data to reduce the influence of each 
individual sample on the output. The implementation introduced in [110] of differential privacy for deep 
learning consists in adding noise to the gradients at each iteration of the iterative training algorithm. It 
provides probabilistic guarantees on the level of privacy reached by a model, i.e., how hard it is to retrieve the 
actual training data from the model. It acts as a regularization technique, and in this respect it prevents 
overfitting but also may greatly reduce the performances of the systems in terms of accuracy if the level of 
privacy is too high. 
Differential privacy comes in addition of additional measures to increase the level of protection, such as 
preventing the direct access to the parameters of the models, and limiting the number of queries an 
adversary might be able to do on a system. 
3.4.3 Distributed and federated learning 
Distributed and federated are two different situations where the learning of the model is not performed by a 
single actor, bust instead by a multitude of different parties that may or may not be connected between each 
other. In distributed learning, all parties are learning the same model, and shares information about the 
gradients. With federated learning, only parameters of the model are exchanged between actors. In this 
setting, each actor has only access to its part of the dataset, while taking advantage of a more robust model 
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that is trained using various source of data. Though information about the training data can still leak through 
the model, this greatly reduces the disclosure of sensitive data. 
3.4.4 Training over encrypted data 
Fully homomorphic encryption is a special kind of cryptography methods that allows to perform additions and 
multiplications on encrypted data. Its integration in machine learning algorithms in still in its early 
stages [111], but it does suggest that learning over encrypted data could be a reasonable strategy when the 
sensitivity of data is high. An external contractor could then train a model on data that have been encrypted 
by the data provider, and returns an encrypted learned model, and this without having an understanding at 
any time neither of the data nor of the purpose of the model. 
While this approach suffers from a certain number of limitations, the main one being the current high 
computational cost of a single operation compared to the unencrypted approach, it is an active area of 
research that already provided working implementations [112], and that will likely grow in the coming years. 
Secure aggregation [113] is a different yet close technique to secure communications of information between 
different parties, by suggesting ways to securely share information about models. It is particularly useful 
when combined with federated learning. 
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4 From technical to policy solutions 
AI is a rapidly growing technology, which is becoming the driving force of a new industry that takes advantage 
of its power to build innovative perception and predictive systems at a relatively low cost. The impact of this 
technology on EU citizens will be significant, because of the numerous areas in which AI is expected to be a 
tool to assist or replace human decisions: health, justice, transportation, economy, job market, to name a few.  
Technical advances to provide assurance that the technology is in line with human values have been part of 
the research in AI, but they do yet provide strong guarantees on the reliability of such systems. At the same 
time, the integration of AI components in products and services, and its use in sensitive contexts, requires an 
intervention of regulatory bodies to avoid potential harms on EU citizens. 
Standards and of certification procedures regarding the use of AI are fundamental components to build a 
favourable ecosystem around this emerging technology, that will guarantee the alignment between AI 
objectives and human values. They will allow:  
— industrial actors to share common set of best practices that encourages interoperability and the right 
integration of AI inside existing infrastructures;  
— regulators to build efficient policies that protect citizens’ right while preserving economic 
competitiveness;  
— users to understand and trust the novelties and possible disruptions of AI.  
In the following are discussed two approaches of ways to provide a regulatory framework for the use of AI, 
through the angles of, respectively, the robustness and explainability. Several suggestions are made to include 
technical mechanisms at the different stages of the conception of a product with an AI component, from the 
conception, to the development, and to the maintenance of the product. These suggestions are a first step 
and do not constitute a unique answer, and should be considered in conjunction within an appropriate legal 
framework. 
4.1 Certification of the robustness of AI systems 
Regulations should ensure that the cybersecurity and safety of users and systems are taken into account 
during the full lifecycle of an AI product. This means that secure software development practices, security 
certifications, security audits and cybersecurity controls need to be implemented, extending the current 
practices already in place in cybersecurity. Establishing new standards and certifications for AI will take 
advantage of current legislations instruments proposed or already in place. AI systems are under the scope of 
the Cybersecurity Act [114], that introduced an EU-wide cybersecurity certification framework for digital 
products, services and processes.  
Extending this framework for AI is not straightforward: The risks and threats for which a product can greatly 
vary according the technical aspects of the systems, but also the domains of applications and context of uses. 
AI is still a very active area of research, and tools are not yet available to properly guarantee the right 
behaviour of AI-based systems. A certification scheme for AI in this context could be then based on two 
pillars: first, a careful risk assessment of the impact of AI on its environment, as well as the threats posed by 
potential adversaries and existing vulnerabilities. Second, an extensive testing of AI systems through their 
transparency, the evaluation of their performances in edge cases, and their explainability. 
4.1.1 Impact assessments of AI systems 
Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIA) have been introduced in the GDPR and are a key tool to assess 
the risks involved in the usage of automated decision making or profiling [28]. Data controllers can use them 
to identify and implement the necessary measures to appropriately manage the risks identified. These 
measures should implement the safeguards foreseen in the GDPR with respect to the explainability 
requirements.  
Bearing in mind that current trend in the application of increasingly complex machine learning models, data 
controllers should pay particular attention to the inherent challenges that these models present in terms of 
both explainability and robustness. In this regard, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party [28] highlighted 
the need for transparency on the algorithmic processing carried out, not only in terms of the specific 
algorithm employed but also in terms of the data used by it. 
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Indeed, errors and biases in the data used by the algorithm can result in mistakes in the outcome of the 
automatic processing (e.g., the decision taken), which can cause negative impact on individuals potentially 
affecting their interests and rights. When machine learning is involved in the automated processing, 
considering this dimension in the DPIA is of paramount importance, for the reasons further explained in 
Section 3. Data controllers have to be aware of the limitations that such systems exhibit given their nature 
and guided by the DPIA process, introduce appropriate measures to tackle them. For critical contexts where no 
safe and secure technical solution exists, human supervision and final decision-making should remain the 
default option.  
This impact assessment shall not be restricted to systems handling personal data, but to any automated 
system whose the scope of action may have a negative influence on any the interests and rights of 
individuals. This include for instance previously excluded systems such as any physical systems moving 
autonomously in the public space by means of computer vision. 
4.1.2 Testing 
Following the example of the Cybersecurity Act [114], here is a list of the objectives a certification scheme 
should be designed to achieve:  
— Identification of the vulnerabilities of systems, and the potential impacts. These impacts can be on citizen 
and organisations, on an economic, social, and ecological levels;  
— Consideration of the scope of the data and the potential edge cases where the system could fail;  
— Demonstration of the performances on various datasets, including external datasets that have not been 
used in the training phase.  
As for secure systems, no strict guarantee cannot be made on the robustness of systems by malicious actors. 
Nonetheless, AI systems also cannot be strictly verified that it does what it was designed for. The risks of 
such failures should be appreciated with respect to the level of autonomy of the systems, and the impacts 
associated with the consequences of such failures. 
Another important aspect of AI systems concerns their evolution over time. Throughout their operational 
stage, AI models, and this is one of the characteristics that add an extra value compared to traditional 
systems, have to constantly take into account freshly acquired data. Beyond the risk of data poisoning already 
mentioned, that means that after a few updates, a system can present a radically different behaviour 
compared to the time it entered in production. This characteristic raises the question of a possible expiration 
date for the certification. 
Explainability of machine learning algorithms plays a key role in the auditing of algorithms, which is one of 
the proposed safeguards [28] following the requirements of article 22 of the GDPR. The audit of machine 
learning algorithms can help the data controller ensure that they are robust (i.e. unbiased and resilient against 
edge cases and malicious input) and demonstrate compliance with the GDPR requirements. This audit could 
be carried out by a third party and possibly evolve into a certification mechanism. 
4.2 Standardization 
Standardization is a powerful way of acting to reduce the risks linked with the use of AI in systems, through 
the publication of a collection of materials to prevent and mitigate the risks of failures. Certification 
procedures also operate according to standards. The recent good practices released by ENISA for the security 
of various cyber-physical systems such as IoT networks [115] or smart cars [116] constitutes a relevant 
example of what could be achieved for AI. In this spirit, here is a non-exhaustive list of points that can support 
the establishment of standards and good practices to increase the reliability of AI systems. 
4.2.1 Known vulnerabilities 
Establishing a taxonomy of known vulnerabilities of AI systems in different contexts with relevant references 
from the scientific literature, along with the associated adversary tactics and techniques similar to the MITRE 
attack framework6, would give engineers the opportunity to take into account design flaws at the conception 
stage. This would come along with information existing tools and methods to fix those vulnerabilities, or to 
the operating environment to set up to mitigate the risks. These tools include the strategies used at the 
                                           
6 https://attack.mitre.org/ 
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training phase to strengthen the learned model and reduce the surface attack of models, but also the 
different mechanisms to ensure a protection of the data in various threat scenarios. In addition to this, a 
collection of use cases on real-world examples could be provided to illustrate the risks in machine learning 
contexts.  
Machine learning practitioners are essentially coming from statistics and mathematical modelling, and are not 
well aware of standard cybersecurity procedures that might affect traditional software systems. In order to 
disseminate a security culture, the redaction of guidelines could be contemplated, as it has previously been 
done for web programming [117] or scientific computing [118]. In the same way the use of software design 
patterns has provided a structured approach to computer programming, allowing software engineers to 
integrate best practices, in particular concerning security aspects, a similar approach for AI would help 
machine learning engineers to reduce the number of vulnerabilities in their system. 
4.2.2 Systematic transparency 
Transparency is a crucial element to hope to get an understanding of the robustness of a system, its safety, 
and its compliance with regulations. This transparency is essential internally at the conception and operational 
phases of the AI product, and also for auditing and certification.  
Transparency means a traceability of the different stages of the machine learning processing chain, as 
described in the previous section. It should also include how the assessment of the performances of the 
system has been conducted, and in particular which tools have been used and which methodologies have 
been followed. Here again, the establishment of good practices for the proper evaluation of AI systems may 
be of relevance, in order to favour the use of state-of-the-art techniques such as statistical analysis, formal 
verification, external validation, and so on. 
Finally, machine learning models should follow an explainability-by-design approach to take into account from 
the beginning of the cycle life of product the need to provide explanations to users and/or regulatory bodies. 
This is particularly true when personal data are part of the training dataset, or if the system can have a 
negative impact on fundamental rights of users. More generally, explaining the decision of a system is 
intrinsically linked to its reliability. A sound explanation guarantees the correlations extracted by the algorithm 
from the data are causal relations that have a sense in the considered system, and not spurious relationships. 
4.2.3 Understandable explanation 
The meaning of what the academic literature in AI refers to as interpretability or explainability of an AI model 
is very different from the meaning of an explanation that is generally discussed in other social contexts 
(see [55, 49, 53, 56] for the ongoing academic discussion). In essence, the fact that the output of an 
algorithm is interpretable does not necessarily imply that this interpretation is sufficient as an explanation, 
either considering the domain of application of the systems (e.g., a medical explanation in a health context) or 
from a legal point of view.  
According to the level of criticality of applications and the threats to the system, different levels of 
requirements to be determined should be applied. Indeed, the relevance of an explanation is subject to the 
targeted audience: explaining the decision to an end user, to a technical engineering team or to a certification 
body requires different tools and approaches, and should be done considering both the technical limitations of 
AI interpretability and legitimate expectations of stakeholders. To this end, the definition of recommendations 
to connect technical interpretability methods and explanations would go one step further in the understanding 
of AI systems. 
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5 Conclusion 
Expectations about AI are high and there are good reasons for it given the latest advances in the field and the 
growing number of success cases of its application in several domains. However, it is important to understand 
the limits of the current generation of AI algorithms that are leading this revolution, which are still far away in 
terms of capabilities from autonomous systems with human-level reasoning skills. Nevertheless, these 
algorithms, led by the latest developments in the fields of deep learning and reinforcement learning, have 
proven to be very effective in performing specific tasks, in some specific cases reaching superhuman 
performance. They will likely not replace the human operator in the foreseeable future, but instead free 
resources for complex tasks. Because of this, it is expected that these algorithms will become a key element 
in digital information systems in many areas to achieve goals more effectively and efficiently.  
On many aspects however, AI systems that are currently under development are far from achieving the 
minimal requirements of safety and security that would be expected from autonomous systems. As much as 
their performances, unthinkable a decade ago, are impressive, their implementation in real-world applications 
could pave the way to major disappointments if it is not done within a controlled framework. The prime 
importance of data in the development of machine learning models is to the detriment of the understanding 
of the underlying mechanisms, exposing digital systems to various vulnerabilities. This considerably limits the 
transparency of decision processes, and poses risks on the respect of the fundamental rights. AI systems may 
also be subject to various risks regarding to their reliability, with the multiplication of edge cases not 
considered by the algorithms, and, in adversarial contexts, to a partial or complete loss of control of systems 
to the benefit of a malicious actor. Finally, it poses several risks in terms of data protection, with potential 
issues concerning the confidentiality of data used to train the machine learning models. Broadly speaking, 
various risks for the interest and rights of users have been taken into consideration, and appropriate 
safeguards measures have to be implemented, based on current scientific knowledge.  
As of now, several avenues for reflection could be considered to undertake the implementation of standards 
in AI technologies, and of security and reliability certifications of AI components embedded in real systems. 
These avenues include:  
— developing a methodology to evaluate the impacts of AI systems on society built on the model of the 
Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIA) introduced in the GDPR, that would provide an assessment of 
the risks involved in the usage of AI models to the users and organisations; 
— introducing standardized tests to assess the robustness of AI models, in particular to determine their field 
of action with respect to the data that have been used for the training, the type of mathematical model, 
and the context of use, amongst others factors; 
— raising awareness among AI practitioners through the publication of good practices regarding to known 
vulnerabilities of AI models, and technical solutions to address them; 
— promoting transparency in the conception of machine learning models, emphasizing the need of an 
explainability-by-design approach for AI systems with potential negative impacts on fundamental rights 
of users.  
The importance of the establishment of good practices and threat-driven procedures to strengthen the trust in 
AI systems is of paramount importance. This is all the more important with respect to the fact that AI is an 
active scientific field, in which practices and techniques move fast. Building policies able to keep up this pace 
and to stay relevant in the long term will be undeniably a determining factor for the success of the 
integration of AI in all sectors of the society. 
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